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The conventional theory suggests that primary groups among the 
dissatisfied participants in an organization tend to decrease the 
compliance of the participants. But the present study found in 
a Nationalist Chinese Air Police company that primary groups 
among the dissatisfied actually increase the compliance. An 
explanation of the conflicting finding will be discussed. 
The General Problem 
The significance of primary groups in organizational study is well 
known. The authors of The American Soldiers (1949) found in tactical units 
that the direct identification with the total symbols of the military organiza-
tion as a whole, of the state, or of the political cause in the name of which 
a war was fought, was relatively unimportant as contrasted with the feelings 
of strength and security in the military primary groups and loyalty to one's 
immediate comrades. Such feelings contributed greatly to the combat effective-
ness of individual soldiers (see also Shils, 1950; Goodacre 1951; Grinker 
and Spiegel, 1963; Oanowitz and Little, 1965). A positive relation between 
primary groups and organizational effectiveness has also been found in many 
industrial situations (hare, 1962:254-255, 263, 375, 390). 
There are, however, situations in which primary groups may decrease 
organizational effectiveness. The authors of The American Soldier also 
observed that high cohesive groups with norms which were contradictory to 
official orders led to widespread deviation from orders (1949:411). Seashore 
(1945) concluded in his extensive study of industrial work groups that high 
cohesive groups differed more frequently and in greater amount than low 
cohesive groups from the plant norms. These deviations are toward both higher 
and lower productivity. The seemingly conflicting findings suggest that the 
relationship between primary groups and effectiveness is not a simple one. 
The fact that cohesive groups are more capable of either supporting or 
resisting the formal organization has been explained in literature. As Adam 
(1953) suggests, the cohesive group may provide a minimum amount of socio-
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emotional activity which is necessary for improving communication, maintaining 
group unity, or resisting hardship. Homans adds that cohesive groups tend 
to produce a positive surplus, a margin of safety in the qualities the group 
needs for survival, and that this surplus may be used not simply to maintain 
the existing adaptation of the group to its environment but to achieve a new 
and better adaptation (1951:271-272). Cohesive groups, however, may decide 
that they can better adapt by either supporting or resisting the formal 
organization of which they are a part. 
Seashore (1954) also has offered an explanation for the direction of 
group action in his study of industrial groups. He suggests that cohesive 
groups tend to move in a pro-leadership direction if the formal leadership 
is "supportive" to its subordinates or is able to gratify certain "needs" 
of its subordinates (reward power). In their study of German army, Shils and 
Janowitz (1948) also emphasized the importance of satisfying certain strong 
needs of soldiers in their primary groups by the formal leaders. George (1967) 
made a similar suggestion in his study of the Chinese Communist army. However, 
the present author found in a Nationalist Chinese Air Police (AP) company, in 
which leaders relied on punishment-based control and count not gratify the 
strong needs of the enlisted men, the participation in high-cohesion primary 
groups actually increased the compliance of the enlisted men. The need-
gratification (reward-based) hypothesis may not apply to a punishment-based 
organization. 
The primary groups in the AP company were generally comparable to the 
cphesive groups described in the literature. The group members showed a high 
level of emotional attachments and tended to make the group relationship an 
end in itself. Their attachments were reflected in the fact that they were 
quite willing to help and concern themselves with each other at their own costs 
and without consciously expecting returns.2 But the nature of formal control 
in the AP company was different. The AP company was a peace time unit consisting 
of mostly unwilling draftees in a harsh military environment. The leaders in 
the company could find no way to placate their subordinates. They relied 
heavily on the use of the threat of punishment to enforce their orders. The 
lives in the combat units described in the literature were also harsh. But 
the leaders in these units were able to gratify their subordinates' most 
important need of survival because such a need was frequently consistent with 
the formal goal of destroying the enemy. The military combat units were no 
doubt more likely to be reward-based than the AP company reviewed in this study. 
It is even clearer that the industrial organizations are basically reward-based. 
Primary groups are related to the punishment-based control because group 
participation tends to either inhibit or amplify certain emotions or motives 
generally found among individuals under the threat of punishment. An best-fit-
to-data explanation of this relation will be outlined in the following. 
The threat tends to generate both fear and anger among the threatened. 
Anger may lead to resistance, but it may also be inhibited by fear when the 
threatened feels that (1) he is under constant surveillance, (2) the punishment 
for disobedience would be definitely undesirable, and (3) he has no chance 
to overthrow or escape from the control of the authority. He will obey when 
he feels it is hopeless to resist. 3 
An individual with inhibited anger still has the self-interest of seeing 
someone else challenge or hurt the coercive authority even though he himself 
does not dare to do so. But he would prefer not to see these to whom he is 
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emotionally attached take the risk; the altruistic consideration of the safety 
of one's close friends may suppress the interest in seeing his friends 
challenge the authority. Therefore, participants of primary groups tend to 
persuade each other to play safe and comply with the demands of the coercive 
authority. However, such persuasion will happen only when the participants 
feel that there is little hope in resisting. Before the threat is high enough, 
primary group participants may consider challenging the authority as more to 
gain than to risk for all of them, and may resist collectively. 
Methodology 
All the data were collected in the AP company. The company was stationed 
in a large city in Taiwan and was under the command of both the Air Force 
Headquarters and the Military Police Headquarters. Its major duties were to 
guard some important military bases and occasionally important government 
officials. The company consisted of five to seven officers, 30 to 38 pro-
fessional sergeants, and 32 to 45 draftees. The present paper will include 
only the 58 draftees who served in the company at least part of the eight 
months of this study. 
The author was a vice-platoon leader and acted as the operational 
officer who operated the whole company in one out of every two to four weeks. 
He relied mainly on the method of participant observation in his data 
collection.. As an officer, he had difficulties in gaining the trust of many 
of the men. Fortunately, the draftees in the company were relatively easy 
to approach. Draftees traditionally felt close to a "draftee officer" like 
this author. Draftee officers are usually sympathetic and not inclined to 
use punishment. They also are able to communicate with draftee enlisted 
men with ease because of their similar backgrounds.5 This author tried to 
show his sympathy as often as he could. He even ventured to challenge some 
official rules and his own superiors in order to protect the men. As a 
result, he became quite close to many of the draftees. They spent their 
off-duty time chatting with him; they discussed many sensitive topics, e.g., 
their feelings toward disliked officers in the company; they kidded the 
author on many occasions as they did others of equal rank; and several of them 
even kept contacts with him long after he left the army. 
The relative close relation between this author and his subjects has 
reduced the distortion of the author's role as an officer to a manageable level. 
He felt confident in estimating this distortion and, therefore, the nondistorted 
phenomena. His confidence was increased by the general consistency among 
information from different individuals and among different types of data, e.g., 
observation, interviews, official records, and questionnaires. It was also 
very helpful that this author had a considerable amount of knowledge about the 
lives of draftees and the Chinese army in general before he joined the AP company. 
Two sociometric tests were also given, one at the beginning of the second 
month and one at the beginning of the sixth month. The two tests, combined 
with observations and interviews, are used to measure each soldier's involve-
ment in primary relations. A dual-question questionnaire was made use of in 
the tests: 
1 . With whom would you like to be in the same squad? 
2. Whom would you like to have as your reading partner(s) (in the 
"Four Books" class)? 
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The questions were made with a consideration of the particular circumstances 
in the company. The author taught a course on Confucius1 "Four Books" which 
is a part of the routine training program for all the privates and sergeants 
in the military police units. The draftees were allowed to choose their own 
study partners and were organized into self-chosen groups. If one of a group 
failed in a weekly examination, the whole group would lose their off-days 
for two weeks. Names of seven to nine unpopular personalities were purposely 
announced as "good readers," according to the previous examinations. All the 
rest were emphasized as "lousy." Since test results had never been announced 
before, this announcement was the only objective information the draftees 
had concerning good readers. Therefore, anyone who chose his friend was 
facing the threat of losing his off-days. Since the loss of off-days was 
uniformly felt by draftees as an important loss, the draftee had to have a 
more-than-moderate amount of emotional attachment to his friend if he chose 
a friend. This is the rationale behind the second question of choosing study 
partners in the questionnaire. 
The test arrangement just discussed was the best the author could do 
under all the restrictions of the circumstances. The results of the 
question turned out to be highly consistent with observational and interview 
data, and is an acceptable indicator of primary-group relations. 
The first question of choosing the squad fellows was based on the 
assumption that soldiers would like to choose as their squad fellows the 
comrades they were fond of because they will have to share much of their 
daily lives with their squad fellows. This question failed to indicate the 
primary relations since marginal men also made their first and second choices. 
The best measure of primary group involvement seems to be the combina-
tion of the two questions, however. If a draftee chose good reader(s) as 
study partners, but picked different persons as his squad fellows, his 
choice was apparently nonemotional or instrumental. On the other hand, a 
highly attached group member who had chosen his (bad-reader) friend(s) as a 
study partner(s) must also like to have his friend(s) in the same squad with 
him. Thirty-four draftees were identified as having primary relations with 
others, and the other 23 were low attached. 
Findings 
A. A Coercive Organization 
The leaders in the AP company relied heavily on the use of punishment 
to induce compliance. They punished an average of one to two draftees every 
day, and the punishment ranged from carrying a few hours of extra work to 
being jailed for one month. More important, all the draftees understood that 
the leaders could always increase the severity of punishment to an almost 
indefinite degree until their orders were obeyed. One soldier interviewed 
states, 
...In case of more serious crimes, such as insulting a superior 
or disobeying in the performance of duties, a soldier may be 
court martialed. He may be sentenced to several years or even 
life in prison if he is not very lucky. 
In saying this, the individual quoted was expressing What most, if not all, 
draftees understood and feared. The threat of punishment was very high. 
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The company also had a carefully designed "check system" which was per-
formed by the 13 to 15 officers and squad leaders with the assistance of five 
to six senior professional sergeants. One of the officers or sergeants would 
check the activities of all the draftees on guard every 10 to 15 minutes, 
24 hours a day. The officers and squad leaders who lived and worked closely 
with the draftees under them also watched the draftees' off-duty activities. 
The draftees had little chance of doing anything wrong without being caught. 
The compliance of the draftees was generally high enough to perform the 
company's duties well. Almost all the draftees obeyed unquestioningly even 
though they felt the routine of standing at their posts for six to eight hours 
a day in perfect military manner, plus a few hours of training and irregular 
work, were extremely boring and tiresome. Their high compliance can be seen 
in the fact that they usually were punished for only some minor reasons, e.g., 
a bronze button on a uniform not polished well or a uniform not ironed properly. 
The high threat of punishment was no doubt a major cause of the compliance. 
In a field test, the author tried to minimize the use of punishment in favor 
of the use of warnings and counseling. His actions represented a slight 
decrease in the threats. As an immediate result, he became a popular figure 
among the draftees. On the other hand, the deviant rate of the draftees 
increased from about 40 cases per month to around 55 in.the next month and 
a half according to the official records, the operational officer's diary. 
The number of deviant cases had been rather stable during the previous year due 
to the relatively stable task structures and the deviance-detecting system. 
In a brief counting of the cases in the previous year, the author found that 
the number of cases steadily fell between 34 to 45 each month. It is safe to 
assume that 46 cases or more represents a significant increase. The increase 
in the third and fourth months can be seen in Table I. The deviant rate dropped 
back to normal after the author ended his field test in the middle of the fourth 
month. 
The increase in the number of deviant cases during the field test tells 
only part of the stody. The leaders also found many cases of more serious 
offenses, such as napping on the posts or leaving the base unauthorized. 
These offenses were rare in the company's previous records. 
B_. Primary Group and Compi iance 
In the repressive organization of the AP company, the compliance of 
primary-group participants was clearly higher than that of the low-attached 
individuals. This author examined the officially recorded deviant cases in 
38 days in the second and third months of this study, and in another 38 days 
in the sixth and seventh months, and he found that the low-attached were 
consistently more than twice as likely to violate official orders as the highly 
attached (see Table II). The fact that the statistical difference remains 
significant over two different periods of time should reduce the chances that 
the difference is simply a statistical accident. It also means that the 
organizational changes over the time span did not alter the difference between 
primary groups and low-attached individuals. More important, half of the 
earlier group were replaced in the later months, and the new replacements were 
considerably different from the earlier group: the later group were at 
least high school graduates, but the earlier group had an average of one and 
a half years of formal education less than the later group; the later group 
were more likely to be from urban origins; some of the earlier group were from 
families of Taiwanese origins, but all the later group were from mainland 
families; and all the later replacements were selected and trained by the 
J^^Wé^Ìf^è^ht^beit«èeif>primary groups and low-attached individuals 
^ ^ » ^ ^ ^ f 4 c a r i ^ 4 . t h a r u - t h e number of recorded deviance indicates. The 
|p|^Éc1hétf;àlso accounted for almost all of the most serious cases of 
lfeVf*^r«v:ÌI'.f-?nàpp1ng 'on-;the posts, leaving the base unauthorized, taking 
lfreé;^axi aides'from a remote post back to the barracks, and arguing with a 
iqliadiW'aérà -The primary group participants usually were punished for 
uhirrtent.ional minor mistakes. 
The reviewed need-gratification hypothesis apparently does not apply 
to the findings just described. According to this hypothesis, primary groups 
should decrease, not increase, the compliance of the draftees because these 
draftees did not feel that they were properly rewarded in the company or the 
military. None of them liked their boring and tiresome work. They also felt 
that the highly repressive military command was unbearable. Some bitterly 
complained that the two (or more) years of service disrupted their plans 
(most of them had plans to go to college), and their pay was about eight 
times lower than that of a low-skilled worker in the civilian society. The 
author simply never found a satisfied draftee throughout his tour of service. 
Among 28 draftees thoroughly questioned on related subjects, 14 said that the 
military life was, without any doubt, undesirable, but they could adjust to it; 
8 said that it was highly undesirable and difficult to adjust to; 6 reported 
that it was unbearable and that they were suffering very much. There was no 
notable difference between primary groups and low-attached individuals in 
their dissatisfaction. 
A large amount of data collected by this author generally support the 
alternate hypothesis that primary-group participants tend to persuade each 
other to comply with a highly repressive leadership. The evidence will be 
discussed in the following. 
As mentioned earlier, the draftees' anger toward the repressive command 
and the deprivative nature of military lives were very much inhibited. But 
they still like to see someone else challenge the command even though they 
themselves dared not. Their self-interest in seeing others challenge the 
authority could be seen in the fact that draftees always rewarded the ones who 
dared with high prestige and other favors. In one of the instances, all the 
five draftees elected to positions in several monthly "honor and solidarity 
meetings," the only semi-democratic situation in their military lives, were 
well-known deviants. In the votings, each of the five deviants received votes 
from two-thirds or more of all the draftees. The deviants were heroes. 
However, primary-group participants tended to take the safety of each other 
into their immediate concerns. This concern usually suppressed the draftees' 
self-interests in seeing others within primary groups challenge the hated 
command. Therefore, they would persuade each other not to take any "hopeless" 
and "senseless" risks.. Such persuasions actually happened in the primary 
groups in the AP company. A draftee, Chai, once voluntarily stated in a 
long conversation with the author: 
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..Lu [his kou-mer Cor buddy)] always gets into trouble because he 
likes to argue with our squad leader. I always try to convince 
him that we won't be here forever; why can't he just be patient 
and get through the two years of service happily?...They [squad 
leaders] don't really care if you can take it or notj they 
would make your life as miserable as you can imagine...Only a 
fool will do things like that [only a fool will fight the squad 
leaders]... He [Lu] agreed with me but sometimes he still can't 
control his temper. 
The persuasion to keep a friend out of trouble is evident in this passage. It 
is also clear that Chai persuaded his kou-mer because of his emotional attach-
ments to his kou-mer. As Chai added, 
...If I didn't really care for him, I wouldn't bother to repeat 
this kind of talk like an old mother...I never talked to any 
other in this way. 
The author talked to Lu, Chai's kou-mer, on the same day. Lu stated his 
own experience. 
...Everybody knows what will happen if you get smart [challenge 
the authority] here. A real friend is the one who tries to 
hold you back [from challenging the authority]...Chai was right. 
I am pretty sure that he has helped me a lot. If I didn't know 
Chai, I might have been jailed for many times [because I like to 
argue with my squad leader], 
Lu's past behavior was consistent with the interview data. According to 
the officers in the company, Lu was a known rebel in the company long before 
this author joined them, and he was charged for "unwilling to obey" three times 
in the first month after this author's arrival. But Lu received no such 
charges in the later months. Lu was no doubt one of the most changed rebels 
in the company. 
Two other primary groups, one of two draftees and another of three, also 
have provided similar type of data. In one of the two groups, the participants 
reported that they seldom openly discussed the problem, but they had clear 
understandings that they wanted each other to play safe and to comply with the 
1eaders' demands. 
The author questioned another 12 draftees, six highly attached and six 
low-attached, about "what are some reasons for draftees to disobey their 
superiors?" In the long discussions with the author, the low-attached draftees 
clearly showed more uninhibited anger toward their superiors than the highly 
attached ones did. More importantly, all the highly attached clearly tied 
their primary relations into their own behavior of compliance when the author 
asked that they give concrete examples. For example, draftee Laing described 
that once he refused to help a fellow draftee to shirk work. The refused person 
got angry and called Laing "the operative officer's walking dog." Laing's 
kou-mer was there at that moment and was about to beat up this person. Laing 
had to try hard to hold his kou-mer back. Laing's kou-mer also told Laing, "if 
they want to risk it, that is their business. They donvt" have any right to let 
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us die [get caught] for them." In this example, we can see that a primary group 
not only may make its participants to comply, but may also resist outside 
pressure toward disobedience. In another example, a highly attached draftee 
stated, 
If you keep your mouth shut when an old sergeant, professional 
sergeant shouts at you, some fellows might think that you lost 
face. But your real friends won't think that way...That is very 
important to me. You don't feel had if you know that your 
friends are on your side. 
It is highly significant that none of the low-attached draftees gave any 
example indicating that any friend persuaded him to comply with the formal 
command, even after the author pushed them hard for more and more concrete 
examples. Many of them, for example, were concerned about the ways their 
squad leaders insulted or threatened them in front of their squad fellows 
and made them uncontrollably angry. But they never mentioned that their squad 
fellows had helped them to withhold their anger. The sharp distinction between 
the six low-attached and the six highly attached may be explained by the fact 
that they were among the most highly attached and the least attached in the 
company. 
There is also evidence that individuals may persuade close friends in 
primary groups to play safe while trying to force others to risk. This may be 
seen in a warning system developed among the draftees. Draftees who guarded 
the posts frequently warned other guards with a phone call whenever they saw 
an officer or sergeant coming to check on them. The operator in the operational 
officer's office also would give an early warning if he saw a sergeant or 
officer walking toward the posts. Protected by such a system, they could relax 
on posts, write letters, or listen to transistor radios. The leaders caught 
and severely punished three draftees who warned others and made many draftees 
hesitate to continue the warning system. The draftees began to sanction whoever 
hesitated by calling them insulting names, e.g., the operative officer's 
dog, the Commander's big son, and so forth. In a period of three weeks, this 
author has caught three draftees who had repeatedly urged their close friends 
to play safe, but called others the insulting names. Apparently these draftees 
would persuade each other to comply only within their primary groups. Their 
forcing others to take risks reflects the predominance of self-interests outside 
of primary groups, 
Many primary groups were involved in the deviant warning system because 
the system benefited all of them. However, the primary groups seemed to become 
more cautious and more able to resist outside pressure when the risks of warning 
others became high. An important fact was that primary groups continued to 
be less likely to deviate in the later months when the warning system was 
popular among draftees (Table 2). As mentioned before, there were also concrete 
cases in which primary groups demonstrated their ability to resist the outside 
pressure toward deviance. 
Primary groups also violated official rules on some other occasions. But 
they usually did so only when the threat of punishment was not severe. During 
the period of the field test of reducing the threat, different primary groups 
left the barracks to buy ice cream cones or drinks. The field test was the 
only period in which primary groups were found committing more serious dis-
obedience. The primary groups also tended to violate some loosely enforced 
orders about as often as low-attached individuals. For example, kou-mers 
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might stay up late chatting with each other when they were supposed to be 
sleeping. They knew that leaders wouldn't do more than shout at them for 
such a minor violation. The findiny suggested that primary groups would 
increase compliance as a reaction to the high threat of punishment. 
The findings generally supported the argument that the altruistic nature 
of primary group tends to make its participants take into account each other's 
safety and well being in high threat situations. Therefore, the participants 
tend to persuade each other to comply with a highly coercive formal authority, 
and increase their compliance. The hypothesis may be strengthened by 
examining other plausible explanations. This author has considered many of 
such alternative explanations in reviewing his findings. 
Following the conventional line of analysis, we may expect that primary 
group interactions tend to reduce the relative deprivation induced by the 
repressive command and undesirable military life. Therefore, primary-group 
Earticipants may be more satisfied and have less desire to resist. This ypothesis was not highly supported because the author found no significant 
difference between primary-group participants and low-attached in regard to 
their (dissatisfactions). 
Another alternate explanation of the findings of the higher deviance 
for low-attached individuals is that some draftees may have certain personality 
traits which make them fail to get along with either their fellow draftees or 
their superiors. Therefore, personality traits may have caused the correla-
tion between marginality and disobedience. This explanation is also not very 
plausible. The AP company performed very important duties including more-than-
infrequent operations to provide guards for President Chaing Kai-Shek. Hence, 
all the draftees in the company were carefully selected by the high command. 
All of them had proven themselves to be very obedient under a highly coercive 
command in at least their six months of basic training. They were unlikely to 
be habitual rebels. Moreover, many loners among the draftees also reported 
that they had close relationships with fellow soldiers in their basic training 
days. Few of them can be qualified as habitual loners. If these deviant-loners 
in the AP company indeed had certain traits which made them into deviant-loners, 
the chances would be small that they would be able to hide these traits in 
their long and rugged training and other military duties before they joined the 
AP company. 
We also may consider the possibility that compliance may cause the difference 
in informal group participation, rather than the other way around. It is logical 
to suspect that some draftees may decide to stay away from the rebels in order 
to avoid unnecessary troubles with their superiors. This is unlikely, however. 
The leaders in the company had shown no intention to harass the friends of 
rebels as long as the friends weren't rebels themselves. More important, some 
rebels were very popular personalities in the company. Although they failed 
to establish primary relations with their fellow draftees, they never had 
difficulty in finding willing companions in their leisure time. Apparently 
most draftees would not be afraid of associating themselves with any rebel in 
the company. In general, the author could not find a well-supported alternate 
hypothesis. 
A8-Kansàs.i.jQurnal tóf ..Sociology 
Ihe^bffv^HtfònàT'theory suggests that primary groups among discontented 
partieipahts^ih-an organization tends to decrease the compliance or effective-
ness of the participants. But the present study found in a Nationalist Chinese 
Air Police company that primary groups among the discontented actually increase 
the;compiiance. The suggested explanation of the conflicting finding is that 
the Conventional theory is applicable in explaining reward-based organizations, 
but not the coercive organization such as the AP company. The high threat 
of punishment exercised by the formal authority tends to make the high-attached 
members of primary group be concerned themselves with each other's safety. 
They tend to persuade each other to play safe and to comply with the leadership 
demands. 
The present study is claimed to be suggestive, not definitive. The study 
of a punishment-based organization is particularly difficult. Usually the 
authority in the organization (or frequently the authority in the large 
society) do not like to see anyone study the ways they coerce people under 
their control. On the other hand, the threatened individuals are often highly 
reluctant to offer honest information. Social scientists still do not know 
how to overcome these difficulties easily. Any study of a punishment-based 
organization is likely to be suggestive at the present. However, the hypothesis 
suggested in this study may be tested in any peace-time, non-voluntary, army, 
or a prison, or any other coercive organization. 
Footnotes 
1. This is the same direction toward which individuals tend to move according 
to the students of "human-relation" leadership (Mayo, 1946; Homans, 1947; 
Berelson and Steiner, 1964:374-375). However, groups tend to do more than 
individuals in any direction they choose. 
2. The altruistic nature of the primary group is frequently described in 
literature. A clear example is suggested by two eminent psychiatrists, Roy 
Grinker and John P. Speigel. In summarizing their work with the Air Force, 
they made this statement on primary groups: "The men seem to be fighting 
more for someone than against somebody" (cited from Janowitz and Little, 1965: 
77). 
3. A large number of psychological studies on punishment have been reviewed 
in Berkowitz (1962) and Gurr (1970). 
4. It was particularly difficult for the author to interview the professional 
sergeants who traditionally looked down on the resented , the green reserve 
officers. 
5. A typical reserve officer is only two to three years older than draftees, 
and he has about four years formal education more than his subordinates. 
In the case of the AP company, the officers and most of the draftees were 
so-called "mainlanders," the more recent immigrants from the Chinese mainland. 
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Table 1 
Deviance of All Draftees by Month 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
mo. 
6 th 7th 8th 
E5££ CaSeS 40 38 55 « 35 41 45 41 
Based on the official records in the operative officer's diary. Forty-six 
or more cases is regarded as a significant increase. See the text for 
justification. 
Table 2 
Deviance by all Draftees by Group Participation 
I. 38 Non-consecutive Days in the 2nd and the 3rd Month. 
a. No. of Deviant b. No. of Draftees 
Cases in Company 
c. Average Deviance 
a/b Per Draftee 
High Attached 
Group Member 15 18 .83 
Low Attached and 
Marqinal Men 36 . 1 7 2.11 
51 35 1.46 
t * 1.91 Df = 33 
significant at .05 level Cone tail test), 
II. 38 Days in the 6th and 7th Month. 
High Attached 24 28 
Group Member 
.86 
Low Attached and 29 12 2.41 
Marginal Men 54 40 
t - 2.5 Df = 38 
significant at .0 level (one tail test). 
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